A key task in the elicitation of expert knowledge is to construct a specific elicited distribution from the finite, and usually small, number of statements that the have been elicited from the expert. These statements typically specify some quantiles of the distribution, perhaps the mode and sometimes the mean or other moments. Such statements are not enough to identify the expert's probability distribution uniquely, and the usual approach is to fit some member of a convenient parametric family. There are two clear deficiencies in this solution. First, the expert's beliefs are forced to fit the parametric family. Second, no account is then taken of the many other possible distributions that might have fitted the elicited statements equally well. We present an approach which tackles both of these deficiencies. Our model is nonparametric, allowing the expert's distribution to take any continuous form. It also quantifies the uncertainty in the resulting elicited distribution. Formally, the expert's density function is treated as an unknown function, about which we make inference. The result is a posterior distribution for the expert's density function. The posterior mean serves as a 'best fit' elicited distribution, while 1 the variance around this fit expresses the uncertainty in the elicitation. When data become available, uncertainty about the expert's posterior distribution induced by the uncertainty in their prior distribution can then be described.
Introduction
We consider the elicitation of a single person's beliefs about some unknown continuous variable θ. We refer to this person as 'the expert', and the expert's 'beliefs' is a term that is intended to encompass all the expert's knowledge, experience and expertise concerning θ. The objective of the elicitation is to identify the underlying continuous density function f (θ) that represents the expert's beliefs. For convenience of exposition, we consider an analyst who receives the expert's elicited statements, and suppose that the analyst wishes to make inferences about the expert's density function f (θ). (To avoid convoluted language, we let the expert be female and the analyst be male.)
The use of elicited prior distributions will always be contentious in practice, irrespective of any theoretical justification (and even disregarding any considerations of bias). One important concern is the extent to which the density function resulting from the elicitation represents what the expert actually believes. In many cases, prior to the elicitation the expert is unlikely to have considered quantifying their uncertainty probabilistically, and certainly not to the level of detail as specified by a density function. Winkler (1967) argues that the expert does not have a 'true' prior density function waiting to be elicited, only a 'satisficing' prior distribution that the expert is "content to live with at a particular moment of time". If we accept this position, it follows that there can be no unique 'satisficing' prior distribution, and almost certainly different analysts (using different elicitation methods) would elicit different distributions from the same expert.
This issue is generic to all elicitation; with the exception of some trivial cases we doubt an analyst could ever claim that a single density function f (θ) was the sole correct representation of an expert's beliefs. Any subsequent analysis that only considers a single f (θ) must therefore be ignoring the uncertainty that the analyst still has about the expert's genuine beliefs. We believe that to improve the credibility and robustness of expert elicitation, this uncertainty needs to be assessed formally. Specifically, rather than producing a single f (θ), the analyst needs to derive a set of all the distinct density functions that he believes to be consistent with the judgements provided by the expert. This in itself is not a novel suggestion; Berger and Berliner (1986) advocate exploring robustness of posterior inferences to the choice of prior. A crucial distinction here is that by considering prior beliefs about the form of the expert's density function (e.g. smoothness), the analyst can probabilistically assess his uncertainty about the expert's beliefs (and so conduct a probabilistic robustness analysis if required).
Uncertainty about the expert's distribution
It is assumed that the expert cannot state her density function explicitly; only that she can state certain summaries of her distribution such as the mean or various percentiles. A finite set of elicited summaries does not of course identify f (θ) uniquely, and we identify this as the primary source of uncertainty about the expert's beliefs.
A common strategy is to choose a density function that fits those summaries as closely as possible from some convenient parametric family of distributions. Some examples of this are Kadane et al. (1980) , O'Hagan (1998) , Garthwaite and AlAwahdi (2002) and Oakley (2002) . Two deficiencies in this approach are that it forces the expert's beliefs to fit the parametric family, and that it fails to acknowledge the fact that many other densities might have fitted those same summaries equally well. Practical responses to these criticisms include using a process of feedback to verify that the fitted density is a satisfactory approximation to the decision-maker's beliefs, and checking the sensitivity of subsequent inferences or decisions to varying the fitted f (θ).
We present here an approach that addresses both deficiencies together in a single coherent framework. Our fitted estimate of the expert's f (θ) is nonparametric, thereby avoiding forcing it into a parametric family, and we explicitly quantify the uncertainty around this estimate that results from the expert having stated only a finite set of summaries. We treat the problem of fitting a density function to given summaries as an exercise in Bayesian inference; we have an unknown quantity of interest (the expert's density function f (θ)), the analyst formulates his prior beliefs about this quantity, then receives data in the form of summaries of the expert's density function. The analyst then updates to obtain his posterior distribution for f (θ). The analyst's posterior mean can then be offered as a 'best estimate' for f (θ), while his posterior distribution quantifies the remaining uncertainty around this estimate.
A second source of uncertainty in an elicitation is the expert's inability to make probability judgements with absolute precision. A complete assessment of the uncertainty about the expert's beliefs should also allow for this. In section 6 we suggest a simple extension of our method for acknowledging this imprecision, thought we do not aim to give a comprehensive treatment of this issue in this paper.
The analyst and the expert
The field of elicitation is diverse, and addresses a number of related but distinct problems. One common problem is the reconciliation of the beliefs of several experts, whereas we consider a single expert. In Lindley et al. (1979) , the aim is to reconcile incoherent expert probability judgments, and prior beliefs about the expert's probabilities for events {E 1 , . . . , E k } are stated in terms of the analyst's own probabilities for the events {E 1 , . . . , E k }, and what probabilities the analyst believes the expert will state if a particular event E i is true. The approach of French (1980) , Lindley (1982) and Lindley and Singpurwalla (1986) is similar, in that the analyst receives the expert's statements as data, to be used to update the analyst's own beliefs about θ.
It is important to emphasise that our objective is quite different from that of these other authors. In this paper, the analyst is making inference about the expert's density function f (θ), not about θ. Another way to view the distinction is that in the approach of French, Lindley and Singpurwalla it is the analyst who is the decision-maker, and therefore whose distribution for θ is ultimately required, whereas in our method the decision-maker is implicitly the expert, because it is the expert's distribution for θ that is required. We emphasise that the separation of the roles of the analyst and the expert is primarily for convenience of exposition. In principle, they could be the same person. However, the expert rarely has expertise in probability and so the role of a separate analyst is often a practical necessity.
In this framework, one should clearly be wary about the analyst adding, through his prior distribution for f (θ), his opinions and beliefs to those of the expert. We nevertheless argue that it is possible, and can be of real practical value, to express prior opinions about someone else's density function f (θ) without necessarily having knowledge about θ itself. Consider the following simple example: suppose it is given that (possibly as the result of an insubstantial elicitation procedure) the only statement made by an expert is that she is sure an unknown quantity lies in some interval [a, b] . In this instance we would not believe that all density functions with support confined to this interval are equally likely. For example, we would not expect the expert to have negligible probability in the interval [a, (a + b)/2], otherwise it is likely that she would have stated that she was sure that the unknown quantity lies in the interval [(a+b)/2, b]. We might also expect her density function to be smooth, and perhaps more likely to be unimodal rather than bimodal, as the expert might then have stated two intervals rather than one. These opinions can be expressed without explicitly stating our beliefs about θ, or even without knowledge of what θ represents. Our formulation of the analyst's prior for f (θ) will explicitly incorporate such beliefs. We discuss further the non-neutrality of our analyst in Section 7.
Scope and organisation of this paper
There is much more to the process of eliciting expert knowledge than is addressed in this article. Questions should be carefully formulated in terms that the expert understands, and so as to avoid known ways in which experts tend to misjudge probabilities. There are many other important practical questions regarding how the analyst should actually conduct the elicitation, and for advice we refer the reader to Chaloner (1996) , Clemen (1996) and Garthwaite et al. (2005) .
In the next section we describe the analyst's prior beliefs about the unknown density function. Posterior inference for this density is described in section 3. A test example is given in section 4. In section 5 we show how to propagate the uncertainty in the prior distribution through to the posterior distribution as data become available. Finally, in section 6 we briefly consider the difficulty that any expert will have in giving a precise numerical probability for any uncertain event, and suggest a simple modification of our model to account for this.
2 A prior distribution for the unknown density function.
We now require to formulate the analyst's prior distribution for the expert's density function f (θ). In subsection 2.1 we first formulate the analyst's prior in general terms as a Gaussian process, and in subsection 2.2 we consider how to specify prior distributions for the hyperparameters of the model. Then in subsection 2.3 we discuss the appropriateness of the Gaussian process and other alternative specifications.
The scaled Gaussian process
A very useful and flexible prior model for an unknown function is the Gaussian process, and we will assume that the analyst's prior beliefs about f (θ) can be represented by a Gaussian process. In particular, the analyst's prior distribution for any finite set of points on this function is multivariate normal. Gaussian process priors for functions have been proposed in various different settings, including regression (O'Hagan, 1978, and Neal, 1999) , classification (Neal, 1999) and numerical analysis (O'Hagan, 1992) . The Gaussian process is specified by giving its mean function and variancecovariance function. We will model these hierarchically in terms of a vector α of hyperparameters. First let the analyst's prior expectation of f (θ) be some member g(θ | u) of a suitable parametric family with parameters u. Thus
Now it would not be realistic to suppose that the variance of f (θ) would be the same for all θ. In general, where the analyst expects f (θ) to be smaller his prior variance should be smaller in absolute terms. We reflect this in our model by supposing that the variance-covariance function has the scaled stationary form
where c(θ, φ) is a correlation function that takes the value 1 at θ = φ and is a decreasing function of |θ − φ|. In general, the function c(., .) must ensure that the prior variance-covariance matrix of any set of observations of f (.) (or functionals of f (.)) is positive semi definite. Here we choose the function
This will be seen to be a mathematically convenient choice, and implies that f (.) is infinitely differentiable with probability 1. This formulation was given in Kennedy and O'Hagan (1996) , who were interested in quadrature for computationally expensive density functions.
Our model represents a belief that the expert's density function f (θ) will, to some extent, approximate to a member of the parametric family g(θ | u). However, the model is nonparametric and allows the true f (θ) to have any form at all. The hyperparameter σ 2 specifies how close the true density function will be to its prior mean, and so governs how well it approximates to the parametric family. The hyperparameter b controls the smoothness of the true density. If b is large, then two points f (θ) and f (φ) will be highly correlated even if θ and φ are far apart.
Hierarchical prior distribution
The hyperparameters of this model are α = (u, σ gives an improper posterior.
Furthermore, the analyst will not expect the true density to be highly multimodal. If u contains a variance parameter v, then it is reasonable to suppose that b is of the same order of magnitude as v, since this then expresses a belief in moderate smoothness of the true density over the range for which f (θ) is non-negligible. This implies prior beliefs about the ratio b/v.
In the following sections we will consider the particular case where u = (m, v) and g(. | u) is the normal density with mean m and variance v. We re-parameterise the covariance function as follows:
where 
Alternative models
One obvious problem with the Gaussian process is that it allows f (θ) to be negative, whereas of course it must be positive for all θ. We will show that by eliciting enough information from the expert, although there will always be some probability that However, an appreciable probability of the function being negative in the tails of the expert's distribution will be unavoidable. To resolve this, we then truncate the analyst's posterior distribution for f (θ) at zero using simulation. In our experience this increased computational burden presents little practical difficulty, and is a small price to pay for the tractability of the Gaussian process model.
It is also known that ∞ −∞ f (θ)dθ = 1, and although equation (1) ensures that this holds for the prior expectation of f (θ) it will not hold for realisations of the Gaussian process. We apply this constraint as part of the data in Section 3. Effectively it is applied also to the prior distribution, and this implicitly will add a further component of correlation to (3).
We have described a model for the unknown density function in which f (.) is allowed to deviate nonparametrically from a parametric density function g (. | u) . This is a common theme in Bayesian nonparametric inference; see for example Leonard (1978) , who modelled the log of the unknown density function as a Gaussian process, and more recently Hjort (1996) and Walker et al. (1999) . In general these alternative modelling approaches guarantee a positive density function, but they were developed for the problem of density estimation, where inference is required for an unknown distribution based on a sample of observations from that distribution. The elicitation context is quite different,and our data comprise elicited summaries of the distributions, such as quantiles. These alternative models would become completely intractable for such data. For instance, if ln f (θ) has a Gaussian process then we cannot even write down the likelihood for data which comprise integrals of f (θ).
West (1988) presents a prior distribution for an expert's quantile function Q(U )
for U ∈ [0, 1]. His formulation leads to a Dirichlet model for the expert's distribution.
As in Lindley et al. (1979) , this is in the context where the analyst is the decisionmaker and so it is the analyst's beliefs about θ that are of interest, whereas we are interested in the expert's beliefs. Note that a possibility here would have been to model the quantile function as a Gaussian process; this would solve one problem in that Q(U ) can be negative, but create a new one in that Q(U ) must be nondecreasing.
Prior to posterior updating
Our model for the analyst's prior distribution is designed to handle the kinds of information commonly elicited from an expert. This includes quantiles of the distribution and simple moments. Since f (θ) has a Gaussian process distribution conditional on the hyperparameters α, the distribution of any linear functional of f (θ) (which includes moments and other expectations such as the probabilities that define given quantiles) is normal.
Formally, let the data comprise a vector D of elicited summaries of this form.
Remember that D will also include the information that The forms of these quantities for some common summaries are given explicitly in the Appendix.
It then follows immediately from properties of the multivariate normal distribu-
also has a normal distribution with
In fact, conditional on α the analyst's posterior distribution of f (θ) is again a Gaussian process, with these as its mean and variance-covariance functions.
Removing the conditioning on α
The 
Examples
We will illustrate the method with two synthetic examples. The aim of the first example is to demonstrate how the analyst is able to identify a density function that is of a markedly different shape to his prior expectation g(θ) (a normal density), given sufficient judgements from the expert. Suppose that the expert has the following density function for θ:
The analyst asks the expert to state P (θ < x) for the following x: {-3,-2,-1,0,1,2,3}.
(The analyst does not ask for the expert's mean here). 
so that large jumps in m t are more likely to be accompanied by large jumps in v t .
Note that the proposals (12) and (13) 
Example 2: bisection method
One significant concern in elicitation is the ability of experts to appropriately assess the tails of their distributions. Alpert and Raiffa (1982) report an experiment in which subjects were asked to provide 98% intervals for various uncertain quantities known only to the experimenter. It was found that these intervals contained the true values only 53% of the time. In an attempt to reduce overconfidence, various elicitation schemes have been suggested in which the expert is not asked for extreme percentiles. One such scheme is the bisection method, described in Raiffa (1968) .
Here the expert is asked for their median and quartiles via the following questions:
1. Can you provide a value p 0.5 with θ equally likely to lie above or below this value? 2. Suppose you were told θ < p 0.5 . Can you now provide a value p 0.25 with θ equally likely to lie above or below this value? 3. Suppose you were told θ > p 0.5 . Can you now provide a value p 0.75 with θ equally likely to lie above or below this value?
In principle this process can be extended, though the expert is likely to find further subdivisions increasingly difficult. Murphy and Winkler (1974) report good results with this method, though Garthwaite and O'Hagan (2000) suggest that overconfidence is reduced more effectively if the expert is asked to provide three equally likely intervals.
Here we show that given only the median and quartiles, posterior uncertainty about f (θ) can be considerable, particularly if the expert's distribution is skewed.
We consider a parameter θ that is known to be positive, but is likely to be close to zero. It is straightforward to handle this scenario by transforming θ to the log scale, and then modelling the density function of log θ as a Gaussian process, with the expectation of f (log θ) given by a normal density function. The same prior as described in section 2.2 is used for b * . We can then transform back to the original scale when reporting the posterior distribution of f (θ).
The initial elicited probabilities are P (θ < 1) = 0.25, P (θ < 1.7) = 0.5 and P (θ < 2.7) = 0.75. We then compare the analyst's posterior distribution for In figure 4 , upper panel, we plot the analyst's pointwise 99% intervals for f (θ)
together with these three parametric estimates (we do not necessarily expect these to lie in the bounds, as they are not constrained to match the elicited probabilities exactly). Note that there is considerably more uncertainty about f (θ) given the three percentiles only. Of particular interest here is the right-hand tail. In figure   4 , lower panel we can see that the analyst's posterior uncertainty encompasses the different tail behaviours exhibited by the three parametric approximations.
Additionally, we can consider the analyst's uncertainty about the expert's mean value of θ. For a skewed distribution, it is very unlikely that the expert would be able to specify their mean value directly, and so it could only be deduced by considering the expert's complete density function. The three parametric fits give mean values of 2.010, 2.189 and 2.668 respectively. The analyst's 99% interval for the expert's mean is (1.91,2.63), with 2.668 as the analyst's 99.5th percentile. The uncertainty in the mean value is not trivial and could, for example, be important if the expert needed to identify E(θ) for use in a decision problem. To reduce this uncertainty, the expert would have to make a judgement about the tail of her distribution, such as its 95th percentile. Alternatively, if the expert was unwilling to make a tail judgement, she might consider using the analyst's posterior expectation of E(θ) as her mean value, if she was willing to accept the analyst's prior assumptions about f (θ).
Uncertainty about posterior beliefs f (θ|x)
Whether the uncertainty about the expert's distribution matters in practice will depend upon the use to which it will be put. One obvious use for an elicited distribution is to serve as a prior distribution f (θ) for a Bayesian analysis of some data x. It is then of interest to derive the uncertainty that is implied for the resulting posterior density f (θ|x). We consider inference about a posterior probability P (θ ∈ A|x). We write
with Θ the sample space of θ. Conditional on α (the complete set of hyperparameters in the Gaussian process model for f (θ)), we see that P (θ ∈ A|x) is the ratio of two correlated normal random variables. Hinckley (1969) gives the density function for the ratio of two correlated normal random variables, though its form is not amenable to the computations that we will require.
We simulate random probabilities from the analyst's distribution of P (θ ∈ A|x).
Given data D from the elicitation, we can sample from the distribution of α|D, and then from {P (θ ∈ A|x)}|α, D (by simulating random values of the numerator and denominator in (15) from their bivariate normal conditional distribution).
Example 2
Berger and O 'Hagan (1988) give an example of two engineers stating prior probabilities for the mean life θ of a proposed new industrial engine. The engineers both state P (θ ∈ I i ) for a set of intervals I 1 . . . , I 6 , and these probabilities are listed in tables 1 and 2. Given these prior probabilities, pointwise medians and 95th percentiles for each engineer's density function are plotted in figure 5:
In addition to their prior beliefs there are data x consisting of two observations with likelihood function f (x|θ) = θ −2 exp(−4500/θ). In Berger and O'Hagan (1999) , the objective was to compute maximum and minimum values for posterior probabilities for various classes of prior distributions, rather than to quantify probabilistically the uncertainty in the prior/posterior distribution. Consequently, we can only informally compare the two approaches.
We now simulate values from the distribution of P (θ ∈ I i |x) for the two engineers.
In a sample of 10,000 generated values, the smallest and largest values generated are reported in tables 1 and 2 for each interval. For comparison, ranges of posterior probabilities are given for two prior families of distributions considered in Berger and O'Hagan (1999): Π 0 , any prior distribution that has the correct elicited prior probabilities given by the expert, and Π 2 , any prior distribution that has the correct elicited prior probabilities, is unimodal and has a particular upper bound for the maximum value of the density. Note the discrepancy between the Gaussian process model and the Π 2 class regarding interval I 2 for engineer B. This is because the probabilities specified by engineer B are incompatible with a distribution that is both smooth and unimodal; a smooth distribution would have to have to have a turning point in the interval (0, 2000) . interval for the posterior probability using the Gaussian process model.
Uncertainty in the elicited probabilities
A difficulty in any elicitation is that the expert will not be able to specify any probability with absolute precision. For example, if the expert states P (θ ∈ A) = 0.6, she may have difficulty in justifying why she stated P (θ ∈ A) = 0.6 and not P (θ ∈ A) = 0.65. This issue was considered in Walley (1991) , who proposed bounding a probability P with upper and lower probabilities, P and P respectively. This still leaves unresolved the issue of how to specify P and P with absolute precision.
Additionally, the expert may also feel that values in the centre of the interval [P , P ] represent their uncertainty more appropriately than values towards the ends of the interval. This is an important yet under-researched theme in elicitation. In this paper, we suggest a simple pragmatic approach for acknowledging this imprecision. interval for the posterior probability using the Gaussian process model.
We interpret the reported probability P * (θ ∈ A) as the expert's 'true' probability plus an additive 'error' which represents the imprecision in the stated probability: Lindley et al. (1979) and both consider models for errors in probability judgements, but in the context of incoherence rather than imprecision. We then assume that ε ∼ N (0, τ 2 ) for some appropriate value of τ 2 . Though normality itself is a strong assumption, we now no longer have absolute lower and upper limits for the true probability P (θ), and it is also more plausible for the analyst to give greater probability to values of P (θ) closer to P * (θ). The variance parameter τ 2 describes the imprecision in the probability assessment, and may vary for different probability judgments. The variances could be chosen in consultation with the expert.
We now return to the example of the two engineers, and consider again the elicited probabilities from engineer B. It was noted that these were incompatible with a smooth, unimodal distribution, and we now consider the effect of allowing for imprecision in the elicited probabilities. We suppose that the six prior probabilities listed in 
We now need to choose a variance for each error ε i . Since the absolute imprecision must be smaller for probabilities close to 0 or 1, we set
The effect of including this 'noise' in the data is shown in figure 6 . The facilitator now expects the engineer to have a smooth, unimodal distribution.
Discussion
We have presented a means of eliciting an expert's prior density function f (.) that both avoids having to assume a parametric form for f (.), and allows us to measure our uncertainty about f (.) given a limited number of judgements from the individual.
In the first example considered, we could provide posterior estimates of f (.) that were very close to the true function given sufficient judgements from the expert. In the second example, with fewer judgements we then had more substantial uncertainty about f (.), but were able to present this uncertainty probabilistically.
Given the the uncertainty in the expert's prior, we were also able to propagate this uncertainty through to the posterior distribution as data became available. Fi- nally, we considered the issue of imprecision in the expert's probability assessments.
The proposed method was simplistic, but easy to implement. We note that this is an area for further investigation, but believe it to be an important component of the analyst's uncertainty about the expert's beliefs.
A number of potential practical advantages of this approach offer directions for its further development. In practice, elicitation is a dialogue between the expert and the analyst. For instance, after eliciting a set of summaries the analyst can consider his posterior uncertainty about the expert's density function before offering a final inference. He may for example choose to elicit more summaries if his posterior uncertainty is too large. Our model may then help to identify which additional summaries would be most informative. The dialogue can also be used to check the validity of the analyst's prior model for f (θ).
The analyst believes that f (θ) is likely to be smooth and reasonably close to an unknown member of some parametric family. In particular, he may model it as approximating to a normal distribution in shape, so that it is likely to be fairly symmetric and unimodal. The second example uses instead a lognormal distribution to account for a situation where θ must be positive and a skew distribution is expected. Notice first that this is already far weaker than the assumption that f (θ) is exactly a member of the assumed parametric family, that is implied by the usual fitting approach to elicitation. Furthermore, given enough summaries from the expert, this prior information will have negligible impact. For instance, if the expert's true density is highly skewed or multimodal then even if the expert's prior is based on a normal g(θ | u) this skewness or multimodality will be reflected in the analyst's posterior, given sufficient data. This is a significant benefit of our nonparametric formulation. At an earlier stage of the elicitation, when the analyst's prior is still influential, feedback should allow the expert an opportunity to disagree with its implications. This will help to ensure that adequate summaries are elicited to reach an accurate posterior distribution for f (θ).
At the end of the process, there will inevitably be some remaining posterior uncertainty about f (θ), but the fact that this is expressed formally in the analyst's posterior distribution makes it easier to check the sensitivity of any inferences or decisions that may subsequently be based on the elicited f (θ). We could consider using a sample of density functions drawn from the analyst's posterior, rather than a single estimate, when making those inferences or decisions, to see whether or not this remaining uncertainty is important.
A Appendix: Likelihood for the expert's sum- 
A.1 Expectation of θ
We define µ = ∞ −∞ θf (θ)dθ. Then under the Gaussian process prior µ is normally distributed with
A.2 Percentiles of θ A value x is chosen, and the expert gives their probability P (θ ≤ x). We write
This also has a normal distribution, with 
Making the transformation 
where
(noting that l 2 is a function of z 1 ). We also need the covariance between percentiles and the mean. This is given by: (20), (28) and (31) all tend to zero.
A.3.2 Large values of |m| and small values of v
In both cases, this can result in g(θ | u) tending to zero for all values of θ sufficiently far from m. For certain percentiles P x , this will result in the corresponding row and column in A tending to a vector of zeros, again giving a matrix A with determinant zero.
